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UNEMPLOYMENT:GETTING THE QUESTIONS RIGHT -
ANDSOME OF THE ANSWERS
ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyzes the issue of persistent high unemployment. It
focuses on two channels of persistence. The first is capital accumulation.
The paper analyzes investment decisions under imperfect competition,
focusing in particular on the effects of demand and cost shocks on
investment, capital composition and bankruptcies, and their effect on
employment and unemployment. The second is labor supply. The paper
analyzes the various channels through which the unemployed may become
disenfranchised, leading to higher equilibrium unemployment. In both
cases, it briefly reviews and assesses the available empirical evidence.




Cambridge, HA 02139The first Chelwood Gate conference on unemployment in 1985
(Economica 1986) could claim major accomplishments. For the first time1
the European experience of high unemployment was analyzed within a largely
common framework, and similarities and differences across èountries
systematically examined. But, at the end of the conference, the sense of
elation at the progress achieved was mixed with uneasy feelings. There
were at least two reasons. First, it was not clear within that frsnework
how one could explain what appeared to have become, by 1985, persistent
high equilibrium unemployment. Second, the diversity of explanations
across countries, which laid the blame alternatively on increases in tax
wedges, shifts in Beveridge curves and assorted time trends, was, given
the commonality of unemployment experiences, very much unsettling.
Thus,Chelwood Gate 2 was born. The research program which is
reflected in the papers presented at this conference has focusednaturslly
on twotasks. The first has been to furtherunify and refine the common
framework. The second has been to extend that framework so as to expLain
persistent high unemployment. Fortunately for researchers, unfortunately
for Europe, equilibrium high unemployment is still with us, giving us
three more years of data and making the question just as topical as it was
three years ago.
Has the goal been achieved or should we already be preparing
Chelwood Gate 3 7 It would be presumptuous for me to give a general
assessment. But, just as at the end of Chelwood Gate I, I have mixed2
feelings. This time, they have a different origin. I am afraid that the
research program may have been overambitious. The model estimated in the
country papers is a rich one, allowing in particular for a putty-clay
technology, allowing for differences across firms and dealing explicitly
with aggregation, estimating the complete structure of demand. While much
is learned, the very richness of the model makei it harder to see how the
model can --inits analytical version- -anddoes --in its empirical
incarnations--, explain what I see as the crucial issue, the persistence
of high unemployment. Thus, in this paper, I present a barebone version
of the model, one which, I hope, preaerves its logic, allows to focus on
the main issue at hand and to discuss, in that light, the results obtained
in the country papers.
In section 1, I go back one step and present the Chelwood Gate 1
model as embodied in the Solow and Bean papers presented at that
conference. This provides a convenient way of introducing the central
issues. Sections 2 and 3 extend that model by focusing on channels for
peraistence. Both rely on the simple idea that prolonged unemployment
leads to decreases in factors of production, leading to higher equilibrium
unemployment. Section 2 examines the role of capital accumulation.
Section 3 examines the role of effective labor supply, the possibility
that prolonged unemployment effectively disenfranchises part of the labor
force. Section 4 discusses a few odds and ends and briefly speculates on
policy implications.3
Lection 1. Chelwood Gate Mark I
Like any model aimed at explaining employment, Chelwood Gate Mark 1
was fundamentally a model of labor demand and labor supply. The model was
however eclectic, recognizing the imperfectly competitive nature of goods
markets and the complex nature of wage bargaining in the labor markeJ.
What follows is a simple version of that model. Its purpose is to
introduce the central issues and it does not do full justice to the
original. In particular it ignores the open economy nature of European
economies. It also ignores most relevant dynamics but thia is only to
introduce them and focus on their implications in the next two sections.
L_lrice setting. wate settinz and aggregete demand,
The model builds on three equations. The first is price setting by
firms under imperfect competition. The second is wage setting, which





Imperfect competition in the goods market and the recognition that
firms actually set prices and thus real product wages, is an important
element of any story about unemployment. The Dixit-Stiglitz version of
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition has proven to be a most useful
workhorse and I follow tradition
At any point of time there is a given number of firms. Each faces




where all variables (here and later) are in logarithms, all constants
(here and later) are ignored. Yj is demand for good i, y is aggregate
demand. p and p are the nominal price of good i and the price level
respectively. Ignoring fixed costs of production production is
characterized by:
=a(yj-k-qi), s>l
where n1, k1, q are employment, the capital stock, and total factor
productivity of firm i respectively2. At any point in time, the capital
stock is given from the past. There may be fixed costs ; this is not
relevant until we endogenize capital and the number of firms.
Profit maximization delivers a price setting equation for each
firm:
pi-Ep —b(-q+(a-L)(Ey-k-q)t(Ew-Ep)); b —(l+c(a-l)),
Ocb<l
Togetherwith this price equation come an employment and an output
equation for each firm. Ignoring for an instant the E.'s on the right
hand side, the relative price chosen by each firm depends on three terms,
which the firm takes as exogenous. The first is total factor
productivity. The second is aggregate demand, scaled by the firm's
capital stock and productivity : an increase in y leads the firm to
increase its price, as well as its output supply and employment. The
third is the aggregate real wage, the nominal wage divided by the price
level. An increase in the aggregate real wage leads the firm to increase
its relative price, and to decrease supply and employment. This is anS
important pointfrom the point of view of each firm, both aggregate
demand and the aggregate real wage are independent forces, and both beyond
its control.
The E.'s stand for expectations and allow for price decisions to be
made not on the basis of current values of y, w or p. but on the basis of
past expectations of those variables. The motivation is to allow for
potential effects of aggregate demand ; the exact specification of what E.
exactly stands for may be quite complex, as work on staggering has shown.
For analytical purposes, assuming either that E stands for expectations
held as of one period earlier, or even more crudely that Ex —x(-l)for
any x is enough to make most points.




Chelwood Gate 1 was, I think rightly, agnostic as to the specifics
of wage setting. Having rejected the Phillips curve black box, we are
just starting to explore relative empirical merits of efficiency wages,
insider-outsider and other theories of wage settingit is far too early
to impose heavy structure on an aggregate wage equation. Following
Chelwood Gate 1, I assume the wage setting equation takes the form
(2) w —Ep+c(n-)+z
whereis the labor force, and z is a vector of variables influencing
wage bargains. One standard interpretation of this equation is as the6
outcome of the choice of the expected real wage and employment by a
monopoly union facing a labor demand schedule, but other interpretations
are possible. Again, E. stands for expectation, generously interpreted.
may include among other things total factor productivity q, or perhaps
actual labor productivity, y-n ; it may include taxes, measures of
mismatch. All of those were included in one or the other of the wage
equations estimated for Ghelwood Gate 1. As will be abundantly clear, 1±
exactform of the wage setting equation and what z includes turn out to b
crucially important, and we shall need to dig deeper into where equation
(2) exactly comes from. I defer digging to later.
Agireate demand
Here, I stay well short of the treatment of aggregate demand in
Chelwood Gate 1 and 2. Given the issues at hand, all I need is the
possibility of shocks to aggregate denand and a negative effect of the
price level on the level of demand. Thus, I assume
(3)y—x-p
where y is again aggregate demand, and x is the vector of variables whici
affect aggregate demand.
2. Equilibrium and actuaj unemolovment rates
Equations (1) to (3) characterize the economy. Given a
specification of the E.'s, one can easily characterize the actual level
unemployment. Or, assuming that the E.'s stand for actual values, one
obtains equilibrium unemployment. I look at them in reverse order. Havii7
done so, I use the results to describe the main conclusions of --and the
issues raised by-- Chelwood Gate 1.
Equilibrium unemployment
Equilibrium unemployment is defined as the level of
unemployment which would prevail, were all expectations equal to actual
values. While when we introduce dynamics, the definition would have to be
explicit as to what past values of unemployment are taken to be
(equilibrium, actual 7), this issue does not arise here yet.
When expectations are equal to actual values, the price equation
becomes:
p-w —- q+(a-l)(y-k-q),or using the production function
p-w —- q÷ ((a-l)/a)(n-k)
Thus, while aggregate demand and real wages are taken as independent.
influences by firms, equilibrium (so defined) implies a relation between
the real wage and aggregate demand. Equivalently, the second line
implies, just as under perfect competition, a relation between employment
and the real wage, a pseudo labor demand relation.
The wage equation is simply
(2')w-p —c(n-)+z
It is clear that those two equations alone determine the
equilibrium real wage and level of unemployment. The real wage set by
bargaining must he consistent with the real wage that firms are ready to
pay. In the useful Lsyard-Hickell (1987) terminology, the target real8
wage, from wage bargaining, must be consistent with the warranted real
wage, the wage implied by price setting. Or, put yet another way,
unemployment must reconcile the income claims of firms and workers. The
aggregate demand relation, as usual, plays no other role in equilibrium
than to determine the price level or the rate of inflation.
Solving for equilibrium unemployment, and denoting it by a star,
gives
(4) fln* —((a-l)+ac)((a-l)(-k)-aq+az)
The equilibrium level of unemoloyment depends on three sets of
factors, the ratio of capital to the labor force, total factor
productivity and whatever factors belong to z.
By contrast, actual unemployment depends on aggregate demand. Its
properties depend on the exact characterization of what the E. 's stand
for. One example makes the basic point
Actualunemp)&yment
Assume that, for both workers and firms, Ep —p(-l)-t-(p(-l)-p(-2)),
andthat for all other variables, expectations are equal to actual values.





Note,from the first equation that there is no longer a simple relation
between the real wage and the level of aggregate demand, or between the9
real wage and employment. Solving the first two equations for prices
gives
(5) p-p(-l) —(p(-l)-p(-2)(b/a)(ac+aL)(n.n*)
This equation has a definite air of deja vu, giving the rate of
change of inflation as a function of the deviation of the unemployment
rate from its equilibrium value. Inflation accelerates or decelerates
depending on whether the rate of unemployment is below or above
equilibrium, a Phillips curve like relation. Unemployment is in turn
determined by aggregate demand and the production function
(6) a—n —-(l-a)k
-a(x-p)+aq
Together, equations (5) and (6) imply that, given x, actual unemployment
converges to equilibrium unemployment.
3. Conclusions from Chelwood Cats I
Within that broad framework, much of Chelwood Gate 1 was focused on
two main issues. The first was that of how much the increase in
unemployment was an increase in equilibrium unemployment, or instead an
increase in actual unemployment over its equilibrium value. The answer
was quite unanimouswhile the increase in unemployment had been in part
due to demand, by 1985 actual and equilibrium rates roughly coincided
this was reflected in the relative constancy of inflation rates.
The second and central issue was thst of what explained this
incresse in equilibrium unemployment, of the respective contributions of
(n-k), q and z. This is where the picture was more confused, both
conceptually and empirically10
Specifications varied in essential ways. One important difference was
for example the treatment of productivity in the wage equation. Should one
assume that z did not include productivity, in which case the model had
the unappealing implication of predicting steadily declining unemployment
7 Or, should one assume that z included productivity, and if so in what
form 7 Should it be total factor productivity -t.eitheractual or trend--,
or should it be labor productivity --eitheractual, n-k, or trend, n*-k 7
The approach of L.ayard and Nickell for example was to assume a priori that
neither p-k, nor q could affect equilibrium unemployment, to assume that z
had the forms —q
-((a-l)/a)(p-k)+z';this implied that the increase
in unemployment could only be explained by factors in z', not by changes
in capital intensity or in productivity growth.
Even when specifications were common, results differed in essential
ways. This was reflected most vividly in Bean et al's summary table
(table 4) of the decomposition of the increase in equilibrium
unemployment, constructed using a common model specification but reaching
drastically different results across countries.
The false dichotomy between equilibrium and actual unemployment
Why didn't Chelwood Gate 1 give a convincing explanation of high
persistent unemployment 7 Fundamentally, this came from too sharp a
dichotomy between equilibrium and actual unemployment.
Part of the appeal of the Chelwood Gate 1 model was indeed that
very dichotomy, which gave a way of organizing thoughts about movements in11
unemployment. The image of unemployment given by the model was one of
aggregatedemand driven fluctuations in actual unemployment around an
equilibriumlevel which itself moved in response to movements in z q and
(a-k).One could then think separately of factors affedting actual and
equilibrium unemployment. But it was precisely this dichotomy which did
not fit the experience of the 1980's, in whichsharp, aggregate demand
induced increase in unemployment had been followed by art increaSe in
equilibrium unemployment. Thus, it was this dichotomy. whichbád to be
abandoned for progress to be made.
It was clear that the dichotomy was at beat a conceptual
convenience. After a period of high actual unemployment, if nominal
rigidities were suddenly lifted, the economy could not and would not
return instantaneously to its previous level of unemployment. Costs of
adjusting labor would for example lead firms to increase employment only
gradually. But, were this the only factor involved, the economy would
return fairly quickly to its previous level of equilibrium unemployment
and the dichotomy embodied in the model above would still provide a useful
conceptual shortcut for all but the short run. The question was therefore
whether there were factors which would be triggered by high actual
unemployment and would imply averyslow return, or perhaps no return at
all, to previous levels of unemployment, explaining the European
experience.
Two such channels were already suggested at Chelwood Gate 1, and
both of them are explored st more length at this conference. The first,
which was emphasized in the papers by Dreze and Sneessens on Belgium, and12
by t4alinvaud on France, is that of capital accumulation. A long period of
high unemployment may lead to capital decumulation, increasing equilibrium
unemployment. This channel is present, but not emphasized, in the model
above. The second was emphasized by Gregory in his paper on Australia. A
long period of high unemployment may lead to changes in the structure of
labor markets, and to the disenfranchise of part of the labor force,
increasing equilibrium unemployment. I explore both of them in turn
examiningtheir logical structure as well as the empirical evidence
presented inthe country papers3.13
Section 2. Capital Accumulation and the Persistence of Unemployment
That the dynamics of capital accumulation can amplify the effects
of factor prices on labor demand and unemployment is an old idea, dating
far beyond Chelwood Gate 1. The response of investment decisions to
changes in real wages or other factor prices under perfect competition is
well understood4. How must the story be modified when we allow for
imperfect competition ?,Afterall, the real product wage isnow a
decision variable of firms. Does it make sense to think of investment as
depending on the wage, on aggregate demand ? I first review the logic of
capital accumulation decisions under imperfect competition before turning
to the empirical evidence.
I; Capital accumulationthe firms decisions -
Themonopolistic competition framework introduced earlier provides
a natural structure to think about investment decisions5. Ignore for the
moment the decision of firms as to whether to operate or to shut dowit (for
example, assume that there are no fixed costs, and that there is a given
number of firms, assumptions to be relaxed later). It is straightforward




where r is the (logarithm of the) real user cost of capital. E.s could
and should be introduced as they were earlier but this is not the point I
want to focus on here. The first line follows from cost minimization, and14
gives kdi given Yj The second line gives optimal Yj when the firm can
choose both factors freely. Combining both to eliminate Yj gives
(7) kd -ki—(y-k-q)+cq-(l/a)[(ac+1-c)r +(c-l)(w-p))
Just as for price, employment and output decisions before, each
firm perceives two independent economy-wide forces as relevant to its
investment decisions. The first is aggregate dàiand ; other things equal,
aggregate demand affects optimal capital one for one (in elasticity
terms). The second is factor prices, the aggregate real wage and user
cost of capital. Factor prices have the usual two effects on investment,
coat and substitution effects. An increase in the user cost decreases
optimal output and optimal capital intensity. An increase in real wages
decreases optimal output but leads firms to shift to more capital
intensive methods of production.
Going from optimal capital to investment requires a specification
of costs of adjustment. This part is well travelled ground, which there
is no need to retrace. When the firm has adjusted to its desired capital
stock, its relative price is given by
(8) Pj-P —-q+(l-(l/a))r +(l/a)(w-p)
which is nothing else than the factor price frontier (adjusted for the
mark up from monopoly power which should appear in the -neglected-
constant term).Long run marginalcost is independent of the level of
output.
2. Capital accumulation and unemployment15
Just as before, while each firm takes aggregate demand and
aggregate real wages as given, theae are determined at the aggregate level
by the interaction of firms decisions, wage setting and the aggregate
demand relation. Here, the steps are the same as in section 1; the
outcome, given k, is characterized by equations (1) to (3) but now k
changes:over time. If.for firms, expectations (the "Es") are equal to
actual values1 then there is a relation between real wages and aggregate
demand, namely equation (1') ; otherwise, there may not he any simple
relation between real wages and aggregate demand. Thus, even at the
aggregate level, we can still think of investment as depending on both
aggregate demand and real wages.
There is no point in tracing through the dynamics of different
shocks.I first work out the long run effects (once capital has adjusted)
on equilibrium unemployment of changes in z. Then, I consider one example
of dynamic adjustment, which reintroduces fixed costa and bankruptcies and
allows to make a number of relevant points.
In the long run, from equation (8), the equilibrium relation
between prices wages and user cost is
(9) p-w —(a-1)r-aq
Thus, if the user cost is fixed (in real terms), the real wage is
fixed from price setting in the long run. Firms will choose prices so as
to reestablish that real wage. Combining this with the wage setting
equation, which for the moment, we still take to be
(2) w-p —c(n-)+z'S
'-'St16
we get an expression for the long run level of equilibrium unemployment
(10)n- —(l/c)(-(a-l)r+aq
-z)
The level of unemployment has to be such as to reconcile the target real
wage with the warranted real wage, which is independent of z. The effect
of z on equilibrium unemployment is clearly larger in the long run thsn in
the short run. This is shown in figure 1short run aggregate "labor
demand", equation (1'), is downward slopinglong run aggregate "labor
demand", equation (10), is horizontal. An incresse in z shifts labor
supply, equation (2) inwards, leading to A in the short run, B in the long
run. The increase in z leads to a short run increase in real wages,
triggering capital decumulation, further increasing equilibrium
unemployment over time.
Shocks to aggregate demand still do not affect long run equilibrium
unemployment (they obviously could if they implied a permanent change in
interest rates and the user cost, as indeed they have done in the 1980's
).Butto the extent that they can temporarily affect unemployment -to
the extent that E.s are not equal to actual values-, they can have
substantial effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to increases in
equilibrium unemployment along the path of adjustment. The dynamics of
adjustment can be very rich. Consider the following example:
Suppose that the economy is a Dixit-Stiglitz economy, where each
firm must, in order to produce, pay fixed -capital- costs. Assume also
that, once fixed costs have been paid, the firm only needs to use labor,
so that marginal cost is constant, With free entry, the number of firms17
is such that there is zero net profit, that the size of the demand facing
each firm is such as to generate operating profits which cover capitat
costs. Assume further that E.s for firms are equal to actual values.
Using those assumptions in equation (1') gives a simple price
setting equation
p-w-q
The wage setting and aggregate demand equations.are as before, with, in
the wage setting equation, Ep —p(-l).This allows for nominal rigidities
and an effect of aggregate demand on unemployment. Thus
w —p(-l)+c(n-)+z
n— y —
wherethe lest relation between output and employment comes from the
assumption of constant returns to labor.
Consider the effect of an.increase in z, say an increase in
workers' militancy, which leads to an increase in nominal wages given
prices. Firms increase their nominal price to maintain their markup. The
increase in the price level reduces aggregate demand, reduces the demand
facing each firm. Thus, the market becomes too small to support all of
them1 and some firms go bankrupt. EmpLoyment decreases. This process
however goes ongiven the increase in the price level, workers further
increase the nominal wage, leading to further increases in prices, further
reduction in demand, further benkruptcies. This process goes on until
unemployment leads workers to accept the warranted real wage. In
equiLibrium, real wages are unchanged, but the number of firms, capital
(fixed costs) and employment are all smaller6. While this has described18
the effects of z, the same analysis can be used to study the effects of a
demand contraction. While a demand contraction has no long run effect, it
leads for some period of time to bankruptcies and decreases in capital and
in employment. Even vhen the initial demand contraction disappears, firms
need to be reopened for the economy to return to its initial equilibrium.
In addition to giving a simple handle on the interacti?n between
capital accumulation and unemployment, this example is useful in other
ways. Consider, in passing, those two points (1) capital decreases here
without any movement in real wages or user coststhis would make life
difficult for investment functions baaed on factor prices.(2) While the
problem is clearly a problem of unwarranted wage demands, firms will
perceive it partly as a problem of wages and partly as a problem of
demand, as the demand they face keeps shifting adversely over time this
suggests the dangers of using firms' perceptions to characterize the
origin of unemployment, as is done in some European countries.
3. Capital accumulation and unemployment. Lessons from Chelwood Gate 2.
The interaction between capit4l accumulation and unempl.oyment is
the first main theme of Chelwood Gate 2. The basic theme is simple and
very much consistent with the analysis above the increase in real wages
in the 1970's and the demand contraction of the 1980's have led to a large
relative decline in capital accumulation, which has contributed to the
incresse in equilibrium unemployment.
Conceptually, this effect is already fully captured in the price
setting equation, and in the model of section 1. Equation (4) makes clear19
how equilibrium unemployment is likely to be affected by the level of
capital accumulation. A decrease in capital shifts marginal cost upwards.
leading firms to increase their price given wages, or equivalently, to
decrease the wage that they offer at any level of employment. This will,
unless workers accept the required fall in the real wage lead to an
increaee in equilibrium unemployment.
-
Thepapers at this conference go however beyond relying on their
estimates obtained from price equations. There are indeed a few good
reasons to think that empirical price equations will not fully capture the
effects of capital decumulation on price setting and thus on unemployment:
The first, which is investigated at length in the papers is the
putty-clay nature of technology. Suppose that the decrease in investment
rates in Europe hides a sharp decrease in the number of machines, partly
compensated by a shift towards higher capital intensity:machines. The
number of jobs consistent with full employment of machines has fallen more
sharply than the capital stock numbers might suggest. Or, and this is
again related to putty-clay, the underlying marginal cost curve (remember
that the price setting equation is, under the assumption of constant
elasticity of demand just a parallel translation of marginal cost) may he
much more non linear than suggested in the price equation above. Finns
may be able to satisfy demand at roughly constant marginal cost until they
hit a capacity constraint at which they cannot increase employment at any
positive real wage. Finally, firms may use delivery lags or rationing
(permanently 7) instead of increasing prices, so that again the estimated
price equation may not reflect the slope of the marginal cost curve.20
For all those reasons, the papers use an alternative,
complementary, approach, and estimate the level of employment consistent
with full employment of capital under a strict short run Leontief
assumption. IThile those papers use a more sophisticated approach, they
confirm what a first pass examination of the data would suggest. Profit
rates decreased sharply in the 1910's and have only recently etarted to
recover the profitability index computed by the EEC, which is normalize
to equal 100 over the 1960's stood at 60 in 1975, 65 in 1980 and stands
now at approximately 757How much of this profit slump is due to dernan
and how much to cost shocks is an important (and well defined, as I have
shown above) question, to which we do not have yet an answer. This
decrease in profitability has affected investment. The table below gives
investment rates in Europe and their relation to the growth rate of
output:
Table 1
(EECI2) Investment/GNP ratio Crovth rate of GDP
70/61 23.1% 4.8%
80/71 : 22.5 3.0%
87/81 : 19.5 1.6%
SourceEuropean Commission
Investment rates have indeed gone down. 3ut if we take marginal
K/Ytobe roughly equal to 2, they appeared to have gone down by less th
would have been predicted from the decrease in output growth, suggesting
that part of investment has taken the form of an increase in capital
intensity. Table 2, which gives average capacity utilisation rates in
manufacturing for EEC countries makes this last point simply.21
Table 2
Capacity utilization in manufacturing industry
Peak73 Trough75 Peak79/80 Trough82/83 January88
EEC9 86.4 15.0 83.9 76.4 84.2
Capacityutilization is now close to historical peak values.
Whether or 'not we must interpret this as telling us that economy wide
employment cannot be increasad is open to question. I do not believe so
and return to the issue in section 4. However it surely tells us that
firms have decreased capacity in line with the slowdown in output, and
that capital accumulation is surely responsible for part of the increase
in equilibrium unemployment.
Thissection has highlighted the potential role of capital in
generating persistence of unemployment. As a transition to the next
section, note however the importance of wage setting in the background.
How capital accumulation affects wages is all important for persistence
and amplification. In particular, a central issue is that of what
productivity term belongs to the wage equation. If for example, wages
depend on actual labor productivity rather than, say, on total factor
productivity, efforts by firms to reduce costs by shifting to more capital
intensive techniques will be self defeating. This is for example the line
of argument used by Heliwig and Neuman(1987) to explain the increase in
unemployment in Germany. More generally, there is an obvious loose end in
the argument that capital shortages are to blame for high unemployment.22
Granted the decrease in capital, we still have to explain whyuneuiployed
workers do not accept lower real wages in the face of such high
unemployment.23
Section 3. Labor Supply and the Persistence of tJnesrnlgymtt
The traditional representation of wage setting had long been in
terms of a Phillips curve relation, between unemployment and wage
inflation given price inflation. It is deer that the current experience
requires us to go beyond such a black box relation. The natural starting
point in Europe is with wage bargaining between unions and firms. While
this also is an age old subject, recent work has suggested new and
important twists. Again, I review the current state of thought and then
turn to the empirical evidence.
1. Persistence of unemployment and membershio effects
If wages are set by bargaining between unions and firms, one would
not expect the unemployed and the employed to have the same weight in
bargaining. Quite simply, one would expect the employed workers to have
more weight in bargaining. This simple remark would seem rather obvious
and hardly controversial ; it has however important implications, and in
particular suggests a very natural channel for unemployment persistence.
The lower the number of workers employed today, the lower is bargained
employment likely to be tomorrow.
The argument was stated by Gregory at Ghelwood Gate 1 and applied
by him to the case of Australia. It has been the subject of substantial
research since then. In Blanchard and Summers (1987), we pushed the
argument to its logical limit, by looking at the case where unions are24
monopoly unions, with membership equal to employment at the time of
bargaining. We showed, not surprisingly, that employment would follow a
random walk. Low employment would lead thoae who remained employed to try
to preserve their jobs, not to lower wages to create new ones. Movements
in actual unemployment would translate one for one in permanent changes in
equilibrium unemployment, an effect which has cdme to be known aa
-
hysteresis(see papers in Cross (1988)).
The following variation on the model of section 1 makes the point
simply. Assume that all firms operate under constant returns to labor
(a—I), and that all E. 's for firms are equal to actual values. This
implies
(11) p—w-q and n—y•q
Aggregate demand is still given by y —x•p,so that replacing p from (II)
gives a derived demand for labor
n —x-w
Given this derived demand, assume that the union chooses the nominal wage
w before it knows x, thus based on Ex rather than x, and that it chooses
the wage so that, in expected value, its members are employed. Assume
finally that membership is given by n(-l) +d(-n(-l)).If d-l,
membership is equal to the labor force ; if d—O, membership is equal to
last period employment. Then, the wage equation takes the form
w —Ex-n(-l)-
andthe behavior of employment (unemployment) is given by
(12) -n —(l-d)(n-n(-l)) (x-Ex)25
All the dynamics of unemployment come from membership effects. If 4—0,
when unions only care about the currently employed, and under rational
expectations for the union, employment follows a random walk.
This limiting case is, like all limiting cases, both revealing and
too strong. It is probably safe to assume that, except perhaps in those
countries where bargaining takes place at the national Level, unions are
indeed mostly concerned about the interests of the employed and, perhaps,
the recently laid off. ut the argument neglects the bargaining power of
firms which presumably have the option, perhaps at some high cost, to
bypass unions and go to the unemployed8. It also neglects the fact that
for many low skill jobs, insider effects are likely to be weak. And thus,
if we are to explain persistent high unemployment along those lines, we
must explain why the unemployed exert little or no pressure on wage
bargaining.
2, Disaffection and the persistence of unemployment
That the long term unemployed appeared to have little effect on
wage setting was also emphasized at Chelwood Gate 1 by Layard and Nickell
in their analysis of unemployment in the 13K.It also has been the subject
of heavy research since then.
The argument that long term unemployment may lead to the loss of
skills, reducing human capital and thus decreasing equilibrium employment
dates back at least to Phelps (1972). That high unemployment today cornea26
from the fact that the long term unemployed have become unemployable does
not however seem to capture the current European experience. What appears
to be at work is a more complex more diffuse, change in attitudes towards
unemployment.
Despite a move since the early 80's toward a less generous
unemployment benefit system, unemployment in Eutope is, for the most part
and for the better, not a life threatening experience. In times of low
unemployment however, there is a stigma associated with being unemployed.
Being unemployed reflects on the individual, rather than on society. A
period of high unemployment which leads to very high rates of long term
unemployment among specific groups chsnges their attitudes. Being
unemployed becomes normal, rather than deviant behavior. The fact that
others are unemployed also makes being unemployed less unattractive. The
low probability of getting jobs leads the unemployed to decrease their
search effort. Beyond those changes in attitudes, deeper changes take
place which further alleviate the burden of unemployment. For example.
the family structure adapts, with a higher proportion of young workers
staying at home to survive more easily on their unemployment benefits.
Government programs develop to provide short term employment to target
groupsthose programs have ssibiguoua effects on equilibrium
unemployment. Early on, they may prevent the development of an
unemployment culture ; the Swedish experience provides evidence in favor
of that effect. But by providing cheaper labor to firms and allowing the
unemployed to go back and forth between unemployment and short term
employment opportunities, they decrease the pressure of unemployment on27
wages. All these effects make unemployment more tolerable. They also
decressehowever the pressure that unemployment puts on wages, thus
potentially increasing equilibrium unemployment.
3. Membirship and disaffection effects empir-ical evidence
-In contrast to the approach used to study the implications of
capital -accumulation, the papers limit themselves for the most part to the
estimation of aggregate wage equations. While conceptually this is
precisely what is needed, I suspect that we have learned everything we-can
from aggregate wage equations, and that we need to go much further.
--There are two reasons to be skeptical of what can be learned from
such equations. The first is the issue of simultaneity. Can we really
hope to identify, when we use yearly data, the wsge and the price setting
equations 7 -Undermany specifications of wage bargaining, all the
variables af-fecting price decisions will also affect wage setting. More
importantly in the present context, the effects suggested above arc likely
to affect wage bargaining slowly over time. The pressure from a given
level of unemployment on wages may slowly decresseover time, as the long
term unemployed slowly change attitudes, as the laid off workers are
slowly ignored in wage negotiations. Testing whether unemployment comes
in levels or in first differences is a very coarse test in this context.
- Whatshould then research be focused on 7 Given the tentative
nature of many of the hypotheses sketched above, I believe that we should
still be at the shopping stage, gathering qualitative and quantitative
evidence which aheds light on those aspects of the labor market, looking28
at the disaggregated evidence from specific industries. And here, there
is plenty of evidence to gather. For example;
On the difference between the employed and the unemployed, between
insiders and outsiders ;Atthe beginning of 1987, in the UK, 34% of
manufacturing workers worked overtime, a figure just equal to the cyclical
peaks in 1974 and 1977, significantly above the '26% overtime figure for
1981 and the 29% observed in the recessions of 1973 and 1976. In June of
1985, 45% of those who were employed thought that they could find a job
quickly if they became unemployed compared to 40% in 1977 when the
unemployment was only half as high9. The differential between minimum and
average wage appears to have narrowed in many countries ;inFrance for
example, the ratio of the minimum wage to the wage of a skilled worker (P3
in the French classification) has increased from 57% in 1973 to 67% in
j935l0In the UK, relative wages of workers around the median earnings
level have decreased since 197911. The evidence on the incidence and the
concentration of long term unemployment is well documented (see for
example the papers in Cross (1988))
On the change in attitude with respect to unemployment and changes
in family structure. British libraries in the Midlands make available
pamphlets with the title "Leaving Schoolwhat you should know about
social security benefits." In France, among those under 50 who have been
unemployed for more than two years, 25% are effectively not looking for a
new job, compared to 15% for those unemployed for less than a year. Among
those above SO, the numbers are respectively equal to 44% versus 25%.
Among 25 years old male workers in France, 55% of those who are unemployed29
live at borne, coispared to 30% for those who work12. The unemployment rate
in Spain 1s of 45% for young workers, but reaches 60% for those living at
home
- -
Weclearly have to go beyond such anecdotal evidence. We have to
understand how the unemployed affect wage bargaining. This surely depends
on labor market and goods market atructure and itistitutions, on how easy
it is to create new firma, on whether collective agreements automatically
extend to new firmsandao on. I do not think we fully understand those
aspects-of-the labor market. But both the logic of wage bargaining, and
the anecdotal evidence strongly auggest that the dynamics of labor supply
are acentra-l channel of persistence of equilihriuin unemployment.-30
Section 4. Miasma Parts and Policy
Whilemanydetails are still fuzzy, a broad framework is emerging.
Withitalso emerges a broad consensus about the causes of high persistent
unemployment. The increase in unemployment is attributed to a variety of
supply and demand factors, with supply factors dominating the scene in tha
1970's, and demand factors playing a major role in the further increase in
unemployment of the early 1980's. These original factors have in large
part disappeared. But unemployment has not the reason is to be found in
capital and labor supply effectshigh actual unemployment has led to an.
increase in equilibrium unemployment.
In this last section, I want to touch on twoissues.First, should
we plan further research within this broad framework, or are some
important angles still left out 7 Second, taking our tentative
conclusions about the causes of persistent unemployment at face value,
what policies should we be recommending 7
I. Could we be on the wrong track ?
Many other explanations have been adduced to explain European
unemploymenJ3. Many focus on changes in industrial structure, a factor
which is not emphasized in the above framework. That factor was not
discarded a priori. It was considered at Chelwood Gate 1 : results on
movements in mismatch indices were reported by Layard and Hickell for the
UK, and by Franz and Konig for Germany. Those indices, computed by31
looking at the relation between unemployment and vacancy rates by
industry, region or occupation, did not reveal any obvious increase1
suggesting, contrary to common perceptions, that there had been no drastic
change in the pace of industrial reorganization'4. I suspect that however
that the dismissal may have been too fast:
One of the characteristics of the currentf unemployment situation is
the disproportionate incidence of unemployment among unskilled workers.
The ratio of unemployment rates of semi-and unskilled manual workers to
the total unemployment rate is equal to 1.9 in the UK, compared to 1.2 in
the US. At the same time, there is at least anecdotal evidence of
shortages of skilled workers. This suggests that we may not have looked
in the right direction: •a mismatch index by skill may well reveal higher
mismatch.
What could explain such a mismatch 7 One line of explanation,
which has not received the quantitative attention that it deserves, has
been developed by Piore and Sabel (1924). Put in more neoclassical terms
than their own, the argument is the following. Changes in the nature of
markets and in the nature of products have led over the last fifteen years
to a movement away from mass production to whet they call "flexible
specializationTM. Such a shift translates into a change in relative
demands for skilled and unskilled labor, If the wage for unskilled
workers is inflexible downwards, or if skilled-unskilled wage
differentials are rigid, this shift translates into unemployment of
unskilled workers, and an increase in real wages for skilled workers. It
is clear that this line of explanation does not explain the sharp increase32
in unemployment of the early 1980's; It also doca not easily explain why,
for example, the wage of skilled workers relative to the average wage has not
increased over the last five years, while the reverse held for the wage of
low skilled workers. But it may well be part of the overall story and
deserves more attention.
2. What imolitations should we draw ?
Suppose that it is indeed the case that, hecause of capital and labor
supply effects, equilibrium and actual unemployment are roughly equal. Does
thia imply that there is no room for refletion 7 Put another way, if demand
policies were aimed at decreasing actual unemployment, would equilibrium
unemployment stay high or follow quickly in tow 7
Consider the capital accumulation constraint. The domputation given in
the papers of employment at full capacity utilization suggests a stringent
short run barrier to employment expansion, a marginal cost curve which turns
vertical at levels of employment close to current levels. By contrast, price
equations suggest a much more gently sloping marginal cost curve, suggest
that increased employment may require increases in markups, but may
nevertheless be technically feasible. How can we tell 7 History gives us a
nearly clean experiment and a good hint of the answer.
In 1939, the US economy which had gone for 9 years with high
unemployment was suddenly confronted with a very large increase in demand,
due to the war effort and intertemporal speculation by consumers in
anticipation of future shortages and price increases. With respect to33
capital accumulation, the situation wes not quite the same as for Europe
todayCapital accumulation had been very slow throughout the 1930's and
by 1939, the capital stock stood at 15% below its 1930 level. But
capacity utilizstion numbers were lower in most sectors than they are in
Europe today. Nevertheless the increase in production over the next two
yesrs was truly remarkable Even in those sectots in which capacity is
easily defined and measured, capacity utilization increased to
unprecedented levels. Capacity utilization in steel ingots production.
which stood at 61% in August 1939 hsd increased to reach 99% in October
1941. For cotton spindling activity, capacity utilization increased over
the same period from 85% to 126%... The index of the ratio of private
output to capital which had stood at .68 in 1938 (roughly its mean value
during 1915-1940) stood at .85 in 1941 (and at 1.05 in 1945...). And, as
is well known, unemployment decreased by 8% from 1939 to the eve of Pearl
Harbor in 1941, moat of the decrease being due to an increase in civilian
rather than military employment
This does not imply that the same feast could be achieved by
Europe, especially without pressure on inflation. Indeed inflation,
measured by a wholesale price index, which had remained low until early
1941, started increasing at 2% a month from February on, largely because
of supply bottlenecks. But it makes an important point the capital
constraint is not as rigid as it sounds, and the "capital constrained
employment" figure derived in the country papers at this Conference is
probably not the upper bound on employment. Furthermore, if profitability
is there, higher investment can relax the contraint fairly quickly over34
time15. And profitability appears now to be sufficient for investment to
take place in response to an increase in demand.
What about labor supply effects ? The strict model of hysteresis
presented in section 3 implies that any change in actual unemployment will
be followed by an equiproportionate decrease in equilibrium -unemployment.
This is too sanguine a view. The change in mentlities and institutions
from ten years of high unemployment cannot be suddenly undone by an
increase in aggregate demand. I do not think that we understand the labor
supply mechaniams at work to have strong views as to how fast unemployment
can be safely decreased. Most of the leads reviewed in the previous
section suggest that progress will be faster if an increase in aggregate
demand is combined a major effort aimed at reenfranchiaing those who do
not participate in the labor market.35
FOOTNOTES
When referring to "Chelwood Gate Mark 1", I have in mind mainly the
papers by Bean and Solow, and the country papers which use that framework.
As will be clear below, some of the papers of Chlwood Gate 1 were already
developing the themes which are emphasized in Chelwood Gate 2.
2 This is the first place where putty-clay may make a difference.
This excludes the possibility that, for n-k large enough, the marginal
product of labor is zero.
The reader of the Conference volume will realize that the model I
develop looks on the surface quite different from the Dreze-Sneessens
disequilibrium model which underlies the estimated country models. While
a full discussion of the differences would lead to another paper, the
following remarks may be useful:
I see the main difference between the two as the formalization of
how markets clear or do not clear in the short run. I assume that, at any
point in time, firms set a price and are then willing and able to satisfy
demand, although perhaps at a loss. In contrast, the Dreze-Sneessens
approach sees firms as facing a vertical marginal cost at full capacity,
or labor shortages, so that some firms end up rationing demand because of
insufficient capital or labor.
The issue of short run rationing is an interesting one, and asS the
formalization of the market as a set of micromarkets in disequilibrium may
give useful empirical insights. The construction of "capital-constrained
employment", "demand constrained employment" and "full employment" series
is a simple --although,as I shall argue below, potentially misleading if36
taken too literally- -wayof summarizing and organizing the evidence on
the movements of capital, capacity, the labor force and output. Whether
however there is short run rationing has, I believe, little bearing on the
medium run issues which are the focus of the conference and of this paper.
On those medium run issues, on the logic end the role of capital
accumulation or wage bargaining, I see no substantial difference between
the two formalizations. And I find mine snslytically more convenient...
See for exsmple Bruno and Sachs (1985), for a clear presentation
and an application to the European experience of the 1970's.
A more elaborate analysis of investment decisions under imperfect
competition, closer in spirit to the model used at this conference, is
developed by Sneessens (1987). See also 1'lslinvaud (1980).
6 Solow in his Ghelwood Gate 1 paper suggested an interesting twist to
that story. If the decrease in the number of firms leads to an increase
in monopoly power (this is not the case given the Dixit-Stiglitz
formalization, but would be under the Uotelling-Weitzman approach), the
new equilibrium is characterized by higher markups, lower warranted real
wages. This may require an additional decrease in unemployment.The
same is true if low activity decreaees flexibility, or productivity,
decreasing the wage that firms can afford to pay.(See Blanchard and
Summers 1988).
These numbers are from the Annual Report of the EEC (1987). Lee
(1986) gives recent numbers for nine OECD countries
The argument also neglects the role of capital accumulation. In
choosing wages and the level of employment, the union must also take into
account the effect on capital accumulation and the rate of profit. This
tends also to decrease membership effects.37
Blanchard and Summers (1988)
10 Glaude and Hernu (1986)
Adams (1987)
12 Cezard (1986)
13 Krugman (1987) provides a survey.
14 This is explored in Modigliani et al (1987).38
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